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SYMPOSIUM ON ANTITRUST AND SILICON VALLEY: 
NEW THEMES AND DIRECTION IN COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY 
By Donald J. Polden* 
On March 1, 2019, Santa Clara University School of Law and Santa 
Clara Law Review hosted a national symposium on antitrust law and 
Silicon Valley.  The symposium, held on the campus of Santa Clara Uni-
versity, attracted about 100 attendees, including leading U.S. antitrust 
professors as well as antitrust lawyers from government and the private 
sector.  The leadership and staff of Santa Clara Law Review were ex-
traordinarily successful in putting together this excellent occasion for 
leading thinkers and practitioners in the areas of antitrust law, competi-
tion policy and technology.  This symposium issue of Santa Clara Law 
Review is a product of that symposium and we are pleased to share the 
insights, wisdom, and scholarship of our participants. 
The symposium featured presentations on issues with government 
enforcement of the antitrust laws in employment or talent markets, com-
petition-related issues in pharmaceutical products and “attention” mar-
kets, and cutting edge issues in areas of antitrust compliance and corpo-
rate director liability for antitrust law violations.  It also featured 
discussions of the application of antitrust laws to patented products and 
on the positive and negative implications of the courts’ use of the con-
sumer welfare standard in interpreting the meaning of federal antitrust 
law.  Symposium attendees also viewed an early showing of a new doc-
umentary film, produced by experienced filmmakers in San Francisco, 
on the Steve Jobs led conspiracy among major Silicon Valley tech firms. 
This film describes the firms conspiracy to not poach or hire each other’s 
employees.  This led to an important government action to enforce the 
antitrust laws in markets for employees.1  The one-day symposium cov-
ered a wide range of current issues in antitrust and technology and was 
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 1. To view the film, go to WHEN RULES DON’T APPLY, https://www.whenrulesdontap-
ply.com/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). The site includes a guide to antitrust law issues in no-
poach agreement enforcement actions.  https://www.whenrulesdontapply.com/. 
 particularly timely given the increased concern regarding competition 
related problems in technology markets. 
In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice has dramatically in-
creased antitrust enforcement in markets for talent and employment.  No-
tably, the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division issued an important 
guidance memorandum in Oct. 2016 that alerted human resource profes-
sionals about areas of particular antitrust concern in the areas of hiring 
and compensation.2  The symposium issue features several articles in 
this area.  An article by Michael Murray, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, provides information and guidance for U.S. antitrust and trade 
regulation lawyers on these new policy efforts3 following his major 
agency pronouncement at the symposium of the Justice Department’s 
enforcement policy in this area.4  Murray’s thoughtful exploration of 
government enforcement of antitrust laws in a key input market—labor, 
or talent, or employment—provides an insightful introduction to the 
topic of antitrust enforcement in labor markets.  Professor Orly Lobel of 
University of San Diego delivers a powerful analysis of the importance 
of competition in labor markets, noting that competition spurs innova-
tion, worker mobility, and workforce diversity.5  She argues that various 
employment agreements, such as non-disclosure agreements, covenants 
not to compete, and horizontal agreements among competitors to refrain 
from hiring each other’s employees, exert a pernicious effect on em-
ployee mobility that perpetuates wage gaps and related inequities among 
workers.  In this area of antitrust jurisprudence, I add an article on the 
importance of rigorous government enforcement of antitrust law in labor 
markets.  This article highlights the importance of the government’s re-
cent interventions in pending no-poach agreement private civil cases 
through governmental statements of interest.6 
Joseph Coniglio of Sidley Austin LLP in Washington, D.C., em-
phasizes the continuing importance and significance of the consumer 
welfare standard in antitrust policy-making, including judicial decision-
 
 2. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidance for 
HR Professionals (Oct. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download. 
 3. Michael Murray, Antitrust Enforcement in Labor Markets: The Department of Jus-
tice’s Efforts, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 561 (2020).   
 4. See Michael Murray, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Presentation at the Santa Clara University Law Review Symposium: Antitrust Enforce-
ment in Labor Markets: The Department of Justice’s Effort (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.jus-
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 making.7  The recent public concern about anti-competitive effects in 
technology markets and products has generated concerns that the con-
sumer welfare standard has actually retarded effective antitrust enforce-
ment and that a broader standard for interpreting the reach of the antitrust 
laws is appropriate.8 
Several leading scholars assess antitrust issues related to the patent-
ing, manufacturing, and marketing of pharmaceutical drug products.  
Professor Michael Carrier of Rutgers Law School discusses several ma-
jor challenges for pharmaceutical antitrust enforcement and coverage.9  
He identifies challenges to judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws in-
cluding significant judicial mistakes resulting from complexity, simplic-
ity and Sisyphus.10  While Silicon Valley is best known for industries 
and firms that produce technology products and services, there is a sig-
nificant pharmaceutical industry as well.  Professor Robin Feldman of 
the University of California, Hastings, identifies problems raised for re-
search universities by many of the competition-related problems in drug 
development and proposes suggestions for addressing these problems.11 
Professor John M. Newman of the University of Miami presents an 
interesting and creative article on the lack of antitrust enforcement in 
“attention markets,” in which individuals pay attention to advertisements 
in exchange for access to desired products and services.12  He argues that 
these markets represent the largest sector of our modern, technology-
driven economy and that effective antitrust enforcement is woefully 
lacking.13   
Professor Barak Orbach of the University of Arizona College of 
Law delves into the issue of liability of corporate directors and officers 
for antitrust violations committed by their firms.14  His article explores 
reasons why federal antitrust laws, rather than state corporate and federal 
securities laws, should be a source of potential liability for anti-compet-
itive acts of commission or omission by directors and officers.15   
 
 7. Joseph V. Coniglio, Economizing the Totalitarian Temptation: A Risk-Averse Liberal 
Realism for Political Economy and Competition Policy in a Post-Neoliberal Society, 59 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 703 (2020). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Michael A. Carrier, Three Challenges for Pharmaceutical Antitrust, 59 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 615 (2020).   
 10. Id. 
 11. Robin C. Feldman, Betty Chang Rowe, & Rabiah Oral, Viral Licensing: Ensuring 
the Public Interest When Taxpayers Fund Pharmaceutical Research, 59 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 641 (2020). 
 12. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Attention Markets: Objections and Responses, 59 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 743 (2020). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Barak Orbach, D&O Liability for Antitrust Violations, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 527 
(2020). 
 15. Id. 
 The faculty at the Santa Clara University School of Law and the 
staff of the Santa Clara Law Review hope that you, our readers, will find 
these articles interesting, important to your work, and a valuable contri-
bution to competition enhancement in many markets, including the tech-
nology industries of Silicon Valley.   
 
